THE SUPREME COURT’S HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS
QUESTIONS IN THE ERA OF COVID-19 AND BEYOND
Samuel J. Levine*
INTRODUCTION
For decades, scholars have documented the United States Supreme
Court’s “hands-off approach” to questions of religious practice and belief,
pursuant to which the Court has repeatedly declared that judges are
precluded from making decisions that require evaluating and determining
the substance of religious doctrine.1 Although the Court’s approach is based
*
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Approach]; Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious
Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1645 (2004); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are
Churches (Just) like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 526 (2007); Frederick
Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925, 942–43 (2000);
Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices
and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 497–98 (2005); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court
Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1843 (1998) [hereinafter
Greenawalt, Religious Property]; Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off: When and About What, 84 NOTRE DAME
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NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865, 865 (2009); Samuel J. Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby and the Supreme
Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 26, 26 (2015) [hereinafter
Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby]; Samuel J. Levine, Hands-Off Religion in the Early Months of COVID19 (Oct. 2, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3708424 [hereinafter Levine, Hands-Off Religion in the
Early Months of COVID-19]; Samuel J. Levine, Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme Court Precedent: An Analysis
of the Ministerial Exception in the Context of the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine, 106
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 120, 120–21 (2011) [hereinafter Levine, Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme
Court Precedent]; Samuel J. Levine, Recent Applications of the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious
Doctrine: From Hosanna-Tabor and Holt to Hobby Lobby and Zubik, in LAW, RELIGION, AND
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in well-grounded prudential and jurisprudential concerns revolving around
the role and capacity of judges to adjudicate religious issues,2 the Court has
expanded the contours of the hands-off approach to the point that some
scholars have found parallels in the political question doctrine, accordingly
dubbing the Court’s approach the “religious question doctrine.”3 Whatever

2

3

HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper
eds., Cambridge University Press 2017) [hereinafter Levine, Recent Applications of the Supreme Court’s
Hands-Off Approach]; Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of
Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 85 (1997) [hereinafter Levine, Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach]; Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to
Religious Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793, 794 (2009) [hereinafter Levine, The
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach: An Introduction]; Christopher C. Lund, Rethinking the “ReligiousQuestion” Doctrine, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (2014); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious
Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 39 (2015); Edward C. Lyons, Causation
and Complicity: The HHS Contraceptive Mandate and Asymmetrical Burdens on Free Exercise, 55 S. TEX. L.
REV. 229, 232 (2013); William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 99; William P. Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry Exception to
the Criminal Law, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 239, 241 (2011) [hereinafter Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and
the Religious Inquiry Exception]; Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887,
887–88 (2009); Priscilla J. Smith, Who Decides Conscience? RFRA’s Catch-22, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 727, 728
(2014) [hereinafter Smith, Who Decides Conscience?]; Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111,
1159 (2011); see also Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under the Hereditary
Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 846
n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (referring to “the so-called ‘hands-off’ doctrine in disputes over religious
property”) (citing Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach, supra; Greenawalt, Religious Property, supra; Levine,
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d
1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (referring to “[t]he ministerial exception, and the hands-off approach
more generally”).
See, e.g., Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts,
we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a
religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988) (interpreting the propriety of certain religious beliefs puts the Court “in a
role that [it was] never intended to play”); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (refusing
to assess the “proper interpretation of the Amish faith”); Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others
in order to merit First Amendment protection.”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976) (noting the “error” of “delv[ing] into . . . church constitutional
provisions”); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 451 (1969) (refusing to “engage in the forbidden process of interpreting . . . church
doctrine”); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (avoiding the “forbidden domain” of
evaluating religious doctrine). See generally Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach,
supra note 1, at 85–86.
See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989
WIS. L. REV. 99, 132 (“The Court has developed a religion clause analogue to the political question
doctrine that disposes of many of these cases.”); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 499; Lund, supra note 1,
at 1013. As yet another alternative, some scholars have referred to the “‘no religious decisions’
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the title, the Court’s expansion of the hands-off approach has prompted
substantial scholarly criticism,4 as well as notable instances of dispute—if not
disregard—by prominent judges, likewise on both prudential and
jurisprudential grounds.5
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, these issues have repeatedly
been brought to the forefront of legal, political, and popular discourse, as
courts across the United States, including the Supreme Court, have faced
difficult and often unprecedented—and, heretofore unforeseeable—
questions about the place of religion and religious practice in American law
and society. Concomitant with disputes over limitations on religious
gatherings due to the pandemic,6 in July of 2020, near the end of a term that
was extended because of the virus, the Supreme Court decided two
important cases turning on religious doctrine.7 More recently, confronted
with cases of its own over religious gatherings amid the pandemic, rather
than issuing decisions that provide clear guidance, the Supreme Court has
produced contentious and fractured rulings that stand as but further
illustrations of unsettled and unsettling aspects of these ongoing
controversies.8
This Article suggests that, taken together, judicial rulings and rhetoric in
these cases demonstrate that the hands-off approach remains, at once, both

4
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7
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principle.” See, e.g., Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 845 n.59 (quoting EUGENE
VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 853–63 (2d ed. 2005)).
See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They Must) Judge
Burdens on Religion Under Rfra, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94 (2017) [hereinafter Gedicks, “Substantial”
Burdens]; Gedicks, supra note 1; Goldstein, supra note 1; Maxine D. Goodman, Courts’ Failure to Use
Religion Experts to Decide Difficult Fact Questions Concerning Who Is A Minister for the Ministerial Exception: A
Holy Mess, 72 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2020); Joseph Glyn, Sincere Prisoners, 10 RUTGERS J.L. &
RELIGION 1 (2009); Helfand, Litigating Religion, supra note 1; Michael A. Helfand, Implied Consent to
Religious Institutions: A Primer and A Defense, 50 CONN. L. REV. 877 (2018); Hill, supra note 1; Levine,
A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1; Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra
note 1; Lund, supra note 1; Lupu, supra note 1; Caleb E. Mason, What Is Truth? Setting the Bounds of
Justiciability in Religiously-Inflected Fact Disputes, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 91 (2011); Adeel
Mohammadi, Sincerity, Religious Questions, and the Accommodation Claims of Muslim Prisoners, 129 Yale
L.J. 1836 (2020); Smith, Who Decides Conscience?, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 43–44; Levine, Recent Applications of the
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 83; Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach:
An Introduction, supra note 1, at 804 n. 16 (citing sources).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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vibrant and vulnerable.9 Specifically, the Supreme Court’s July 2020
decisions both reinforced and extended the scope and impact of the handsoff approach, elucidating the basic elements of the Court’s approach while
at the same time exemplifying some of the problems latent in judicial failure
or refusal to decide issues of significant import. The religious gathering cases,
in turn, offer a poignant example of the difficulties the hands-off approach
imposes on judges when the proper resolution of a case seems to require, at
least in part, a measure of inquiry into the substantive doctrine underlying a
religious practice.
Part I of the Article briefly outlines the contours of the hands-off
approach, highlighting the development and evolution of the doctrine and
identifying some of the concerns, justifications, and critiques that have
influenced and accompanied the Court’s analysis. Part II of the Article turns
to the two important Religion Clause cases the Court decided in July 2020,
during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrating the
continuing centrality of the hands-off approach, both enriching and
complicating judicial decision making. Part III examines cases in which
religious claimants challenged governmental limitations on religious
gatherings, finding that differences in attitudes toward the hands-off
approach and other forms of judicial deference may help explain stark
differences in judicial rulings and judicial rhetoric. On the basis of these
assessments, the Article concludes that taken together, these cases
demonstrate the abiding relevance—and limitations—of the hands-off
approach to questions of religious practice and belief, in both ordinary and
extraordinary times. As such, the Article closes with the hope that the
Supreme Court will closely examine the critiques, acknowledge the
underlying problems, and consider some of the proposals that, for decades,
scholars, dissenting justices, and others have offered, toward a more
workable, more effective, and more uniting approach to questions of religious
practice and belief.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS
QUESTIONS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The Supreme Court’s hands-off approach is premised on the notion that,
as a matter of both constitutional principle and judicial prudence, courts
9

See Levine, Hands-Off Religion in the Early Months of COVID-19, supra note 1.
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should not be in the position of resolving questions relating to the substantive
nature of religious practice or belief. The precise contours of the hands-off
approach are complex, and the development, evolution, and expansion of
the hands-off approach have often prompted criticism and dissent.10
By definition, the Free Exercise Clause,11 the Establishment Clause,12 the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),13 and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)14 apply only when the subject
matter of a case involves religion.15 Therefore, as a threshold matter, before
adjudicating a claim under these provisions, a court must first determine
whether the claim should be categorized as based in religious practice or
belief. Notably, however—and, it would seem, somewhat anomalously—the
Supreme Court has not provided a definition of religion. While scholars have
raised concerns over the absence of a guiding principle for understanding the

10
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See supra notes 4 and 5.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
Id.
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person–
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b).
(a) General rule
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing
in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person–
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(b) Scope of application
This section applies in any case in which–
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)–(b).
See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (“[O]f course, a prisoner’s request for an
accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation.” (emphasis
added) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014)).
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very concept at the center of religious claims,16 and some have proposed
working definitions for courts to adopt,17 others have argued that the Court
has appropriately steered clear of a particularly controversial, perilous, and
potentially problematic area of judicial involvement.18 Indeed, according to
this view, which has apparently been adopted by the Supreme Court,
regardless of the precise degree to which judges should or may evaluate
religious doctrine, courts should maintain a hands-off approach to defining
the fundamental question of what practices or beliefs qualify as religious.19
As a corollary to the axiomatic principle that the Religion Clauses and
related legislation apply only to religious claims, even if courts refrain from
offering a precise definition of religion, judges must determine whether the
claimant is sincere in basing a claim in religious practice or belief. Therefore,
the sincerity prong stands as one of the primary grounds upon which a judge
may deny a religious argument—based not on finding that the belief is
invalid or unreasonable, but upon finding the claimant to be insincere.20
Pursuant to the hands-off approach, however, once a court finds a
religious claimant has asserted a sincerely held religious belief, the claim falls
under the protections of religious liberty regardless of how unfamiliar,
unpopular, or distasteful—or seemingly outlandish or bizarre—the religious
nature of the claim may be, when evaluated through the perspective of a
judge, other religious believers, or broader societal viewpoints.21 Since at
least as far back as the landmark 1944 case, United States v. Ballard,22 the
Supreme Court has made clear that even if “[t]he religious views espoused
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See, e.g., Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 34 n.28 (citing sources); Courtney
Miller, “Spiritual but Not Religious”: Rethinking the Legal Definition of Religion, 102 VA. L. REV. 833, 840
(2016).
See, e.g., Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 34 n.28 (citing sources); Mark
Strasser, Free Exercise and the Definition of Religion: Confusion in the Federal Courts, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 909
(2016) (suggesting that the Court clarify the “judgements courts are permitted to make when
deciding whether particular beliefs count as religious”).
See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 1, at 808–09.
See id. at 834 (“We have tried here only to establish the existence of a morally attractive, textually
plausible reading of the Constitution which not only does not require us to define ‘religion,’ but
which treats the refusal to do so as a crucial virtue.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 84 (1944); Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra
note 1, at 34 n.28 (citing sources); Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry Exception, supra
note 1, at 254; John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 713 (describing Ballard and the sincerity element of the case.)
See, e.g., Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 35 n.32 (citing sources).
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
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by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people
[,]” nevertheless, “if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged
with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious
beliefs of any sect.”23 Accordingly, the Court declared, “[w]hen the triers of
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First
Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for
preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position.”24 If nothing else, then,
the Court’s hands-off approach to religion must ensure that judges will not
be in a position of adjudicating the metaphysical truth or validity of religious
practice or belief.25
Later cases offer a somewhat similar but significantly expanded
formulation of the hands-off approach initially set forth in Ballard, precluding

23
24
25

Id.
Id.
Of course, judges, like everyone else, may be subject to degrees of various forms of bias, potentially
resulting in an accordingly greater degree of skepticism toward unfamiliar or unpopular religious
claims, possibly accounting for some of the challenges that have confronted claims of religious
minorities. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. UNIV. L.
Q. 919, 965–66 (2004) (explaining that some commentators argue that judges are biased against
members of minority religions); Amy Bowers & Kristen A. Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of
Conquest: The Story of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, in INDIAN LAW
STORIES 489, 524 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn, & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011) (arguing
that the majority in Lyng effectively held that the Free Exercise Clause does not apply to the Native
Americans’ religion); Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the
Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 234–35 (2003) (noting times when the Justices
have revealed their religious biases); Samuel J. Levine, The Challenges of Religious Neutrality, 13 J.L. &
RELIGION 531, 535 (1999) (reviewing FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH
AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (1995)) (explaining
that secular individuals and religious adherents have different perspectives on where the boundary
lies between a neutral and religiously oppressive act); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority
Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 153, 154 (1996) (acknowledging that the law is written by judges and legislators
who often hold the same biases maintained by other members of society); Samuel J. Levine, A Look
at the Establishment Clause Through the Prism of Religious Perspectives: Religious Majorities, Religious Minorities,
and Nonbelievers, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 775, 780 (2012) (discussing the religious biases that
contributed to upholding Sunday Closing Laws in McGowan v. Maryland, as well as other
decisions, in disregard for the effect on religious minorities); Christopher C. Lund, The New Victims
of the Old Anti-Catholicism, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1001 (2012) (arguing that present-day Catholics are
still inhibited by legal doctrines that were once created to harm the Catholic minority); Suzanna
Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
499, 501–05 (1998) (noting the effects that allowing religion into the public square has on religious
minorities).
In principle, however, a sincere religious claim is entitled to the same protection and
consideration regardless of its seeming implausibility to others.
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courts from adjudicating intrachurch or other disputed interpretations of
religious doctrine.26 As a result, judges may not evaluate the substantive
accuracy of a religious claimant’s belief when asserted to fall within the
provisions of a particular religious system, even if the claim is disputed by
other adherents to the same religious system, or if the claim seems mistaken
or contradictory within the context of the claimant’s other religious beliefs.
In short, the Court’s hands-off approach requires that judges accept at face
value the descriptive accuracy of a claimant’s sincerely held religious belief,
thus entitling the religious claim to constitutional and statutory religious
protections.
Of course, accepting a claim as falling within the protections of the
Religion Clauses/RFRA/RLUIPA merely entails judicial adjudication of
the merits of the claim under these provisions, without implying that the
claimant will prevail. Put in extreme terms, the Free Exercise Clause has
never been interpreted, for example, as a defense to murder.27 Moreover,
under the Court’s current Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, established in
Employment Division v. Smith,28 the Constitution does not protect religious
freedom to violate a neutral and generally applicable governmental
regulation. Even under the broader protections of RFRA/RLUIPA, an
adherent whose claim is grounded in a sincere religious belief must show that
the governmental restriction places a “substantial burden” on the exercise of
religion—and even then, the government will prevail if it demonstrates that
the restriction is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
. . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”29
Still, the likelihood that a religious claimant will succeed is greatly
increased under RFRA/RLUIPA, owing in no small part to the Supreme
Court’s hands-off approach to the religious adherent’s understanding and
26

27
28

29

See, e.g., Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 36 n.33 (citing sources) (listing several
cases where the Supreme Court has explained its hands-off approach to adjudicating disputes over
religious doctrine).
See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–67 (1878) (finding that a party’s religious
beliefs cannot be accepted as justification for the commission of an overt criminal act).
See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (noting that
Supreme Court decisions “have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)’”)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982)) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)-(b).
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depiction of the religious practice in question. Under all accounts, the
compelling governmental interest/least restrictive means test puts in place a
rather high standard for governmental regulations to meet, imposing a form
of strict scrutiny that may be difficult to satisfy.30 Moreover, under the handsoff approach, the “substantial burden” requirement, which triggers the
application of the compelling governmental interest/least restrictive means
test, will likely be susceptible to an interpretation favorable to the religious
adherent. After all, pursuant to the hands-off approach, the Supreme Court
has eschewed an evaluation of the centrality of a religious practice or belief
within the adherent’s religious system. Applying the hands-off approach to
RFRA/RLUIPA may likewise mandate that judges defer to the claimant’s
characterization of the burden imposed on the claimant’s exercise of religion
as substantial.31
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the highly deferential and repeatedly
expanded contours of the hands-off approach, scholars32 and judges33 have
offered various critiques of the doctrine. Indeed, whatever the justifications,
the ramifications of the hands-off approach are significant and wideranging—and, arguably, problematic. For example, in some cases, the
refusal to evaluate the substantive nature of a religious claim may prevent
judges from protecting otherwise valid interests of less powerful groups or
individuals. In deciding church property disputes or claims of employment
discrimination, a court’s unwillingness to closely examine religious doctrine
may result in maintaining the status quo, thereby allowing a powerful

30
31

32
33

See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014) (stating that “[t]he leastrestrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding”).
See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Deference to Claims of Substantial Religious Burden, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
ONLINE 10, 10 (explaining that, under RFRA, “religious objectors need not comply with any
federal law that imposes a substantial religious burden, unless the government can demonstrate that
the law passes strict scrutiny”); Marc O. DeGirolami, Substantial Burdens Imply Central Beliefs, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 19; Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens, supra note 1 (stating that “[c]ourts must
defer to the claimant’s construction of her beliefs, however implausible it may appear to others”);
Levine, Recent Applications of the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 83–86 (discussing
the Hobby Lobby holding and the ongoing tension surrounding the application of RFRA in light of
the hands-off approach to religious doctrine); Smith, Who Decides Conscience?, supra note 1 at 731–32
(expressing skepticism about “courts’ ability to apply a broad RFRA fairly”).
See supra note 4.
See supra note 5.

February 2022]

RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS IN THE ERA OF COVID-19

285

segment of a divided church or a powerful religious employer to remain
immune from potentially meritorious claims.34
In other cases, the failure to take a close and nuanced look at a religious
practice may lead judges to apply a binary analysis to free exercise and
RFRA/RLUIPA claims, favoring either the religious claimant or the
government regardless of the precise nature or significance of the religious
practice at issue.35 Conversely, in response to these and other potentially
adverse consequences, judges—including, at times, Supreme Court
Justices—may defy the hands-off approach altogether, substituting their own
assessment of a religious practice or belief in place of that of a religious
adherent.36
II. THE HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS IN THE
ERA OF COVID-19
A number of cases decided since the start of the COVID-19 crisis appear
to illustrate and amplify many of the problematic aspects of the Supreme
Court’s hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief.
First, the hands-off approach played a central role in the Court’s July 8, 2020
rulings on two of the most prominent and contentious cases of the term: Little
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania37 and Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (OLG).38 Second, throughout the pandemic,
courts across the country, including the Supreme Court, have been
confronted with disputes over limitations on religious gatherings that may
require a close examination of the substance and nature of religious practice,
thereby implicating the hands-off approach. Notably, the disputes in both
Little Sisters and OLG drew upon previous Supreme Court decisions that had
34

35
36
37

38

See generally Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 86 (discussing
how the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to adjudicate disputes that deal with interpreting a religious
practice may provide “unnecessary and improper protections and exemptions to professed
adherents”).
See id. at 87 (discussing the problems that can occur when applying the Religions Clauses too broadly
or narrowly and the results that can follow).
See sources cited supra note 5; infra Parts II and III (discussing the application of the hands-off
approach to Hobby Lobby).
See 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2372 (2020) (deciding whether the government could create exemptions from
the contraceptive requirements for employers with religious objections to them in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010).
See 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2054–55 (2020) (deciding whether the First Amendment allows courts to
adjudicate employment disputes that involve teachers at religious schools).
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previously brought to the forefront—but had likewise failed to resolve—some
of the central tensions and problems latent in the hands-off approach.
A. Hobby Lobby, Zubik, and Little Sisters
Little Sisters was a highly anticipated case, representing the culmination—
or at least the latest chapter—in a closely watched, hotly contested, and
ongoing litigation revolving around several areas of intense legal deliberation
and public controversy: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (ACA), mandates for requiring organizations to provide coverage for
contraceptive methods, and regulations exempting religious organizations
from the contraceptive mandate. The Court had previously decided two
important cases on these issues, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby39 in 2014, and Zubik v.
Burwell40 in 2016. Significantly, Hobby Lobby stands as a stark illustration of
the sharp divide the hands-off approach has engendered among Justices,
while the surprising unanimity in Zubik seems to have merely masked the
lingering and underlying tensions, which returned to the surface in Little
Sisters. Indeed, the debate between Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg in Little
Sisters essentially replayed—and nearly replicated—their debate over the
hands-off approach in Hobby Lobby.
In his majority opinion in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito relied on the handsoff approach to preclude judicial evaluation of the substance of the plaintiffs’
religious claims.41 According to the plaintiffs, providing employees with
health insurance that included access to certain forms of contraception would
impose a substantial burden on their religious practice, thereby triggering
RFRA/RLUIPA protections.42 As Justice Alito framed the issue, “The
Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded by the
39

40

41

42

See 573 U.S. 682, 688 (2014) (deciding whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act allowed the
Department of Health and Human Services to require that employers provide health insurance
that covers contraception, even if employers objected to contraception on religious grounds).
See 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam) (deciding whether it was a substantial burden on
employers’ exercise of their religion to have to submit notice to their insurer or the federal
government of their objections to providing contraceptive coverage).
See Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 29 (describing Justice Alito’s application of
the hands-off approach); Levine, Recent Applications of the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note
1, at 81–82 (citing the deference that Justice Alito invoked in Hobby Lobby, which precluded the
Court from deciding on the accuracy of the plaintiffs’ understanding of their religion).
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 688–90 (deciding whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
allowed the Department of Health and Human Services to require that plaintiffs provide health
insurance with coverage for contraception, in violation of their religious beliefs).
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[Health and Human Services (HHS)] regulations is connected to the
destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for
them to provide the coverage.”43
Because the government conceded the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ religious
beliefs, Justice Alito proceeded with a seemingly straightforward—and,
consequently, deferential—application of the hands-off approach,
precluding the Court from inquiring into the accuracy or plausibility of the
plaintiffs’ contention that complying with the ACA would impose a
substantial burden on their religious practice. Relying on basic elements of
the hands-off approach established in church property disputes and other
Supreme Court cases,44 Justice Alito found that “[a]rrogating the authority
to provide a binding national answer to this religious and philosophical
question” would “in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed [, and
f]or good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take such a step.”45
Justice Alito further relied on the 1981 case Thomas v. Review Board,46
which established one of the key components of the hands-off approach,
precluding judicial evaluation of the substance of a religious claim even if the
claimant’s religious interpretations seem unreasonable or inconsistent.47 In
Thomas, the claimant lost his job after objecting, on religious grounds, to
participating in the manufacture of weapons, though he was willing to work
on manufacturing the steel that was used in weapons.48 The Supreme Court
refused to question the logic of Thomas’s religious commitments, holding
that “it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.”49

43
44

45

46
47

48
49

Id. at 724.
See Greenawalt, Religious Property, supra note 1 (explaining that the Supreme Court utilizes an
approach of noninvolvement when resolving conflicts over religious property); Levine, Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 88–90 (demonstrating the Court’s unwillingness
to engage in interpretation of religious doctrine through examples of church property disputes).
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 724 (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 887 (1990)); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (emphasizing that judges should
not question litigants’ religious beliefs); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (stating that “the First Amendment forbids
civil courts” from interpreting religious doctrine).
See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981).
See Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 92–101 (discussing the
notion that that “[c]ourts are not arbiters of religious interpretation”); Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and
the Religious Inquiry Exception, at 247–53 (discussing the reasoning of Thomas and its implications for
free exercise jurisprudence).
See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710.
Id. at 715.
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Likewise, Justice Alito found in Hobby Lobby, “the Hahns and Greens and
their companies sincerely believe that providing the insurance coverage
demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side of the line, and
it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or
insubstantial.”50 Rather, he explained, “our ‘narrow function . . . in this
context is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest
conviction,’ and there is no dispute that it does.”51 Finally, having agreed
with the plaintiffs that under RFRA the governmental regulation
impermissibly imposed a substantial burden on their religious practice,
Justice Alito also found that the regulation did not constitute the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.52
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by three other Justices, offered a sharply
contrasting view, highlighting the contentious character of the case and,
more broadly, many of the debatable elements of the Court’s hands-off
approach.53 According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court should have rejected
the plaintiffs’ assertion that providing coverage would place a substantial
burden on their exercise of religion, based on her finding that the plaintiffs’
connection to the use of contraceptives by their employees was too
attenuated to trigger an exemption from the requirement that they provide
such coverage.54
To be sure, Justice Ginsburg agreed—as did the government—that the
plaintiffs expressed sincerely held religious beliefs,55 and further
acknowledged that “courts are not to question where an individual ‘dr[aws]
the line’ in defining which practices run afoul of her religious beliefs[.]”56
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg departed from the majority position—and,
seemingly, from the hands-off approach—in questioning the plaintiffs’
designation of the regulation as placing a substantial burden on their religious
exercise. Instead, Justice Ginsburg insisted, the plaintiffs’ beliefs, “however
50
51
52
53

54
55
56

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 725.
Id. (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716).
See id. at 728 (stating that “[t]he least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding . . .
and it is not satisfied here”).
See Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 29 (describing the differences between Justice
Alito’s and Justice Ginsburg’s views); Levine, Recent Applications of the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off
Approach, supra note 1 at 82–83 (highlighting the practical and policy concerns Justice Ginsburg
raised about the majority’s acceptance of the hands-off approach).
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 758.
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715).
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deeply held, do not suffice to sustain a RFRA claim.”57 As Justice Ginsburg
continued, “RFRA, properly understood, distinguishes between ‘factual
allegations that [plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,’
which a court must accept as true, and the ‘legal conclusion . . . that
[plaintiffs’] religious exercise is substantially burdened,’ an inquiry the court
must undertake.”58
Therefore, expressly “[u]ndertaking the inquiry that the Court forgoes,”
Justice Ginsburg “conclude[d] that the connection between the families’
religious objections and the contraceptive coverage requirement is too
attenuated to rank as substantial.”59 Justice Ginsburg based this conclusion
on the reasoning that “[a]ny decision to use contraceptives made by a woman
covered under Hobby Lobby’s or Conestoga’s plan will not be propelled by
the Government, it will be the woman’s autonomous choice, informed by the
physician she consults.”60 Thus, rejecting the majority’s somewhat routine
application of the hands-off approach, Justice Ginsburg seemed to allow—
or require—a measure of judicial evaluation of the cogency of the adherent’s
characterization of a religious belief.61
The stark differences in the opinions in Hobby Lobby reflected and
expanded divisions among the Justices over both the specific issues in the case
and the contours of the hands-off approach more generally. As a result, the
decision left a number of unresolved issues that arose again, just two years
later, in Zubik v. Burwell.62 Surprisingly, however, rather than seizing the
opportunity to resolve some of these contentious and complex issues, and
instead of continuing the debate that played out in Hobby Lobby, the Court in
Zubik issued an unusual unanimous opinion, per curiam, instructing the
parties to attempt to find a resolution of their own.63

57
58
59
60
61

62
63

Id. at 758–59.
Id. at 759 (quoting Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (DC Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 760–61.
See Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 45 (suggesting that Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
is a reformulation of the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach); Levine, Recent Applications of the
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 82–83 (stating that Justice Ginsburg dissented
because her understanding and application of the hands-off approach was more limited than that
of the majority).
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
See Levine, Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme Court Precedent, supra note 1; Levine, Recent Applications of the
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 85–86 (discussing the unanimous, per curiam
decision in Zubik).
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Not surprisingly, though, the unanimity of the opinion masked
fundamental differences among the Justices, reflected, in part, in Justice
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion—joined by Justice Ginsburg—emphasizing
that the Court’s opinion “expresses no view on ‘the merits of the cases,’
‘whether petitioners’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened,’ or
‘whether the current regulations are the least restrictive means of serving’ a
compelling governmental interest.”64 While these issues, deeply implicating
the Court’s hands-off approach, were thus deferred, the divisions among the
Justices remained and would emerge in full force four years later in Little
Sisters,65 decided on July 8, 2020, amidst the first summer of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Little Sisters focused, most narrowly, on whether the government lawfully
exempted certain employers with religious and conscientious objections to
the contraception mandate, which required some employers to provide
contraceptive coverage to their employees.66 In an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, the Court held that the exemptions were valid, primarily on the
basis of statutory and procedural justifications.67 Additionally, the majority
noted that the exemption was consistent with the provisions of RFRA, and
the opinion closed with the declaration that the Little Sisters “have had to
fight for the ability to continue in their noble work without violating their
sincerely held religious beliefs” and that “the Federal Government has
arrived at a solution that exempts the Little Sisters from the source of their
complicity-based concerns[.]”68
Unlike the majority opinion, which acknowledged—but did not focus
on—the implications of the case for the application of RFRA and the impact
of the decision on the plaintiffs’ exercise of their sincerely held religious
beliefs, the concurring and dissenting opinions addressed the religious
practices directly, in many ways reiterating the debate over the hands-off
approach that had divided the Court six years earlier in Hobby Lobby.
Justice Alito issued a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch,
drawing heavily from the RFRA analysis in Justice Alito’s majority opinion
in Hobby Lobby, including a hands-off approach that entails judicial deference

64
65
66
67
68

Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
Id. at 2372–73.
Id. at 2373.
Id. at 2386.
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to the adherents’ understanding of their own religious beliefs. As the
concurrence framed the issue, in evaluating a religious claim under the
substantial burden prong of RFRA, a court must ask a basic and
straightforward factual question: “[W]ould compliance cause the objecting
party to violate its religious beliefs, as it sincerely understands them?”69 If so, as
the Court concluded in Hobby Lobby, “federal courts have no business
addressing . . . whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is
reasonable.”70
Therefore, according to Justice Alito, “[i]f an employer has a religious
objection to the use of a covered contraceptive, and if the employer has a
sincere religious belief that compliance with the mandate makes it complicit
in that conduct, then RFRA requires that the belief be honored.”71 In this
context, the “function” of a court is “narrow”: “‘to determine’ whether the
line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”72 Thus, here too, Justice Alito
applied a hands-off approach to require judicial acceptance of the religious
adherent’s characterization of a religious belief. In short, “‘it is not for us to
say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.’”73
In further reliance on the analysis in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito also cited
extensively from Thomas v. Review Board.74 Applied to the Little Sisters, the
concurrence found that “[t]heir situation was the same as that of the
conscientious objector in Thomas, who refused to participate in the
manufacture of tanks but did not object to assisting in the production of steel
used to make the tanks.”75 Yet again, “[w]here to draw the line in a chain of
causation that leads to objectionable conduct is a difficult moral question,
and our cases have made it clear that courts cannot override the sincere
religious beliefs of an objecting party on that question.”76
In what was to be her final opinion—perhaps fittingly, dissenting on an
issue relating to reproductive rights—Justice Ginsburg responded forcefully

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 2389 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2390 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014)).
Id. (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 724–25).
Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 725 (quoting Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 725).
450 U.S. at 716 (emphasizing that it is not within the judicial function to override parties’ sincere
religious beliefs).
Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2391 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715).
Id. (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 723–26; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715–16).
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to both the majority’s holding and Justice Alito’s RFRA analysis.77 In fact,
like Justice Alito, Justice Ginsburg relied upon her own opinion in Hobby
Lobby, again disputing Justice Alito’s application of both RFRA and the
hands-off approach. In sharp contrast to the majority opinion and Justice
Alito’s concurrence, Justice Ginsburg found that “[t]oday, for the first time,
the Court casts totally aside countervailing rights and interests in its zeal to
secure religious rights to the nth degree.”78 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg
noted, “[t]he expansive religious exemption at issue here imposes significant
burdens on women employees.”79 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg insisted that
under RFRA, “the [previously incorporated self-certification]
accommodation does not substantially burden objectors’ religious
exercise.”80
Justice Ginsburg reasoned that “[u]nder the self-certification
accommodation . . . the objecting employer is absolved of any obligation to
provide the contraceptive coverage to which it objects; that obligation is
transferred to the insurer.”81
Accordingly, she concluded, “[t]his
arrangement ‘furthers the Government’s interest [in women’s health] but
does not impinge on the [employer’s] religious beliefs.’”82 Of course, as
Justice Alito emphasized, this reasoning was contrary to the sincerely held
religious beliefs of the plaintiffs. Thus, as in her dissent in Hobby Lobby, out
of concern for the burdens placed on others, Justice Ginsburg seemed to defy
the hands-off approach, demonstrating a willingness to second-guess
religious adherents’ characterizations of the impact of a law on their own
religious practice and belief.
B. Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe
A similar dynamic played out in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. MorrisseyBerru (OLG),83 decided on the same day as Little Sisters. As in Little Sisters, in
OLG, the Court returned to issues addressed in a previous decision, this time
the 2012 case Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC.84 As in Hobby Lobby, the holding in
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 2400 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2408.
Id. at 2409.
Id. at 2410.
Id. at 2410–11 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 738) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
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Hosanna-Tabor incorporated the Court’s hands-off approach to religious
questions, while like Zubik, the decision in Hosanna-Tabor was issued
unanimously. In yet another parallel to Zubik, however, the unanimity that
was achieved in Hosanna-Tabor may have masked an underlying divide
among the Justices,85 which would later reemerge in OLG, revolving around
the contours of the Court’s hands-off approach.
In Hosanna-Tabor, for the first time, the Supreme Court formally
recognized the ministerial exception, holding that, “[b]oth Religion Clauses
bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to
fire one of its ministers.”86 Specifically, “[b]y imposing an unwanted
minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a
religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments.”87 Furthermore, “[a]ccording the state the power to
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such
ecclesiastical decisions.”88 The Court’s analysis thus turned on an application
of the hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief: to the
extent that a religious group’s employment decisions are based in religious
doctrine, judges may not examine those decisions.
In so holding, the Court relied on its landmark church property decisions,
which established the principle precluding judicial evaluation of theological
determinations issued by ecclesiastical tribunals.89 Similarly, according to
the Court, “it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s
determination of who can act as its ministers.”90 Moreover, the Court took
the application of the hands-off approach even further, holding that “[w]hen

85

86
87
88
89

90

See Levine, Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme Court Precedent, supra note 1 (discussing the variety of options
the Supreme Court would have to decide Hosanna-Tabor); Levine, Recent Applications of the Supreme
Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 1, at 79–81 (arguing that the Hosanna-Tabor Court achieved
unanimity by sidestepping some complex issues and, in the process, left a number of difficult
questions unanswered).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 188–89.
See Greenawalt, Religious Property, supra note 1, at 1858–60 (discussing two major cases involving how
civil courts approach church property disputes); Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off
Approach, supra note 1, at 88–90 (detailing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, an early and important case showing the Court’s unwillingness to interpret
religious beliefs in church property disputes).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185.
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a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination
was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”91
Thus, judges must maintain a hands-off attitude not only with respect to the
substance of a church’s theological interpretations, but also with respect to
the substance of a minister’s claims of employment discrimination.
Finally, based on a number of “considerations—the formal title given [to
the employee] by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own
use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed for the
Church,” the Court unanimously found that the employee in Hosanna-Tabor
qualified as a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.92
Notably, however, the Court did not provide a working standard or
definition to apply in future cases. To address this issue, three of the Justices
who joined the Opinion of the Court found it necessary to add concurring
opinions, both of which incorporated, to varying degrees, a hands-off
approach to this question as well.
Justice Alito, in an opinion joined by Justice Kagan, again offered a
seemingly straightforward application of the hands-off approach,
maintaining that “religious groups must be free to choose the personnel who
are essential to the performance of [key religious] functions[,]” and “[i]f a
religious group believes that the ability of such an employee to perform these
key functions has been compromised, then the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom protects the group’s right to remove the employee from his
or her position.”93 As the opinion acknowledged, though, the employee in
Hosanna-Tabor argued that the church dismissed her for reasons that were not
related to religious doctrine and therefore should not be entitled to judicial
deference.94
Nevertheless, Justice Alito continued to apply an expanded hands-off
approach, because “[t]he credibility of Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted reason for
terminating respondent’s employment could not be assessed without taking
into account both the importance that the Lutheran Church attaches to the
doctrine of internal dispute resolution and the degree to which that tenet
compromised respondent’s religious function.”95 According to Justice Alito,

91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 196.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 205.
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“the mere adjudication of such questions would pose grave problems for
religious autonomy: It would require calling witnesses to testify about the
importance and priority of the religious doctrine in question, with a civil
factfinder sitting in ultimate judgment of what the accused church really
believes, and how important that belief is to the church’s overall mission.”96
In sum, applying a deferential hands-off approach to the religious employer’s
understanding of its own doctrine, Justice Alito concluded that “[w]hat
matters in the present case is that Hosanna-Tabor believes that the religious
function that respondent performed made it essential that she abide by the
doctrine of internal dispute resolution; and the civil courts are in no position
to second-guess that assessment.”97
Adding a brief concurrence, Justice Thomas seemed to find this analysis
unnecessary, invoking a fully deferential hands-off approach to the question
of who qualifies as a minister under the ministerial exception: “[I]n my view,
the Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception
and to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who
qualifies as its minister.”98 Specifically, “[a]s the Court explains, the Religion
Clauses guarantee religious organizations autonomy in matters of internal
governance, including the selection of those who will minister the faith.”99
However, “[a] religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would be
hollow . . . if secular courts could second-guess the organization’s sincere
determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’ under the organization’s
theological tenets.”100
More than eight years later, in OLG, the Court returned to the question
of whether employment discrimination claims against a religious
organization should be subject to judicial review.101 This time, differing
views over the question of who qualifies as a minister for the purposes of the
ministerial exception were no longer confined to brief discussions in the

96
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99
100
101

Id. at 205–06.
Id. at 206. But see, e.g., Jessie Hill, Ties That Bind? The Questionable Consent Justification for HosannaTabor, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 563 (2015) (questioning another scholar’s favorable analysis of HosannaTabor); Levine, Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme Court Precedent, supra note 1, at 135–37 (arguing that the
Court's analysis in Hosanna-Tabor illustrates some of the problematic aspects of the hands-off
approach).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (Thomas, J,. concurring).
Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 197.
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrisey-Berru (OLG), 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
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majority and concurring opinions. Here, the dispute over the definition of a
minister rose to the forefront of the divides between: the majority opinion,
another concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, now joined by Justice
Gorsuch, and a dissent by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg—
collectively illustrating the fault lines around the contours and application of
the hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief.
Writing for the majority in OLG, Justice Alito applied the same hands-off
approach that the Court had invoked in Hosanna-Tabor, stating unequivocally
that “[t]he religious education and formation of students is the very reason
for the existence of most private religious schools, and therefore the selection
and supervision of the teachers upon whom the schools rely to do this work
lie at the core of their mission.”102 Consequently, “[j]udicial review of the
way in which religious schools discharge those responsibilities would
undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First
Amendment does not tolerate.”103
In support of this analysis, the Court once again cited the line of cases
that established the hands-off approach to matters of church doctrine, such
as disputes over church property and other questions of religious practice and
belief.104 In further reliance on Hosanna-Tabor, the majority opinion resisted
the call to “adopt a ‘rigid formula’” to identify which employees qualify
under the ministerial exception, sufficing instead with the finding that
“[w]hen a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the
responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial
intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the
school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment does not allow.”105
Reiterating the highly deferential hands-off approach he propounded in
his concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, Justice Thomas again both joined the
majority opinion and wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined now by
102
103
104

105

Id. at 2055.
Id.
Id. at 2063 n.10 (first quoting Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized
when . . . litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious
doctrine and practice”); then quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 715 n.8 (1976) (“It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as
competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each
are in reference to their own”); and then citing Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 714–716 (1981)).
Id. at 2069.
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Justice Gorsuch. Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s holding that
“‘judges have no warrant to second-guess [the schools’] judgment’ of who
should hold such a position” of “‘carry[ing] out [the religious] mission’” of
the school, repeating his view that “the Religion Clauses require civil courts
to defer to religious organizations’ good-faith claims that a certain
employee’s position is ‘ministerial.’”106
In reaching this position, Justice Thomas cited many of the principles that
have served as the basis for the Court’s hands-off approach to questions of
religious practice and belief. He explained, for example, that “[t]his
deference is necessary because, as the Court rightly observes, judges lack the
requisite ‘understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person
who performs a particular role in every religious tradition.’”107 Indeed,
“[w]hat qualifies as ‘ministerial’ is an inherently theological question,” and
therefore “cannot be resolved by civil courts through legal
analysis.”108 Instead, judges must “heed the First Amendment, which
‘commands civil courts to decide [legal] disputes without resolving
underlying controversies over religious doctrine.’”109
Justice Thomas further characterized the majority opinion as “a step in
the right direction” for “properly declin[ing] to consider whether an
employee shares the religious organization’s beliefs when determining
whether that employee’s position falls within the ‘ministerial exception,’”
because “determin[ing] whether a person is a ‘co-religionist’ . . . would risk
judicial entanglement in religious issues.”110 However, Justice Thomas
contended, “these concerns of entanglement have not prevented the Court
from weighing in on the theological questions of which positions qualify as
‘ministerial.’”111 In his view, “[t]o avoid such interference, we should defer
to these groups’ good-faith understandings of which individuals are charged
with carrying out the organizations’ religious missions.”112
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Id. at 2069–70 (Thomas, J., concurring) (first quoting OLG, 140 S. Ct. at 2066, 2068; and then citing
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
Id. at 2070 (quoting OLG, 140 S. Ct. at 2066).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197).
Id. (quoting Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
Id. (quoting OLG, 140 S. Ct. at 2068–69).
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In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, faulted the majority and Justice Thomas for advancing a handsoff approach that “trade[s] legal analysis for a rubber stamp” of the claims of
religious employers, thereby “all but abandon[ing] judicial review.”113 In no
uncertain terms, the dissent declared—disapprovingly but largely
descriptively—that, under the majority’s analysis, an employee can “be fired
for any reason, whether religious or nonreligious, benign or bigoted, without
legal recourse[,]” based on “a single consideration: whether a church thinks
its employees play an important religious role.”114 Thus, Justice Sotomayor
criticized the OLG majority for “jettisoning most of Hosanna-Tabor’s majority
opinion” in favor of Justice Alito’s highly deferential concurrence in HosannaTabor.115 In fact, Justice Sotomayor declared, “the Court renders almost all
of the Court’s opinion in Hosanna-Tabor irrelevant” and “reframes the
ministerial exception as broadly as it can. . . .”116 In short, according to
Justice Sotomayor, “the Court’s apparent deference here threatens to make
nearly anyone whom the schools might hire ‘ministers’ unprotected from
discrimination in the hiring process[,]” which, she asserted “cannot be
right.”117
Whatever the merits of Justice Sotomayor’s comparisons to HosannaTabor, and notwithstanding the cogency of her concern that the Court’s
holding “risks upending antidiscrimination protections for many employees
of religious entities,”118 at base, Justice Sotomayor’s position calls into
question the contours of the hands-off approach as understood and
articulated by the majority and Justice Thomas. In Justice Sotomayor’s view,
the Court’s decision “permit[s] religious entities to discriminate widely and
with impunity for reasons wholly divorced from religious beliefs.”119
Diametrically opposed to the majority and Justice Thomas, who
characterized the Court’s holding as an appropriate—if not relatively
understated—exercise in judicial deference to the employers’ understanding
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of their own religious practice and belief, Justice Sotomayor found that the
Court’s decision constituted nothing less than “judicial abdication.”120
Thus, the sharp differences between the opinions in OLG exemplify the
ongoing debate over the contours of the hands-off approach. To some, a
broadly conceived hands-off approach represents a constitutionally
mandated and prudentially informed application of judicial deference in
response to questions of religious practice and belief, while to others, broad
acceptance of the claims of religious believers renders courts ineffective in
protecting important countervailing interests of justice and fairness.
III. THE HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS IN THE
ERA OF COVID-19
Against this backdrop—indeed, during the time that Little Sisters and OLG
were being briefed, argued, and decided—courts across the nation were
confronted with litigation over the new legal, political, and social landscape
brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, including cases in which
religious claimants challenged governmental limitations on religious
gatherings. Over the course of the pandemic, these ongoing controversies
have been heard by numerous courts, including the United States Supreme
Court.121 Although resolution of these cases invariably requires a careful
balancing of the interests of religious liberty against the interests of public
health and safety, different attitudes toward the hands-off approach to
questions of religious practice and belief may play a central role in judicial
decision making. In particular, two cases from the early months of the
pandemic illustrate ways in which differences in judicial application of the
hands-off approach may help explain stark differences in judicial rulings and
judicial rhetoric.
In June 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
decided Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker,122 involving a challenge
two churches brought against an executive order limiting the size of public
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Id. at 2076.
See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Religious Liberty in a Pandemic, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2020)
(evaluating the constitutionality of bans on large gatherings, including religious services); Brian J.
Buchanan, Covid-19 and the First Amendment: A Running Report (Feb. 9), THE FREE SPEECH CTR. (Feb.
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Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2020).
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assemblies to ten persons. Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook noted
the plaintiffs’ claim that “a limit of ten persons effectively forecloses their inperson religious services”—notwithstanding that “they are free to hold
multiple ten-person services every week”—and their further claim that “the
Governor’s proposed alternatives—services over the Internet or in parking
lots while worshipers remain in cars—are inadequate for them.”123
Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that “the ten-person cap disfavors religious
services compared with, say, grocery shopping (more than ten people at a
time may be in a store) or warehouses (where a substantial staff may
congregate to prepare and deliver the goods that retail shops sell).”124 As
such, they maintained, “[i]f those businesses, and other essential functions
such as feeding and housing the poor . . . , may place ten unrelated persons
in close contact, it amounts to disparate treatment that a religious service
cannot do so as well.”125 In response, the government countered that
although worship services were, indeed, subjected to a size limit, other
activities, such as concerts, movies, and similar events, were altogether
forbidden.126
Like many courts tasked with resolving these difficult controversies while
considering competing interests and perspectives, Judge Easterbrook framed
the issue as posing a basic question: “So what is the right comparison group:
grocery shopping, warehouses, and soup kitchens, as plaintiffs contend, or
concerts and lectures, as Illinois maintains?”127 Acknowledging that “[i]t
would be foolish to pretend that worship services are exactly like any of the
possible comparisons,” Judge Easterbrook found that “they seem most like
other congregate functions that occur in auditoriums, such as concerts and
movies.”128 In addition, Judge Easterbrook cited a Supreme Court case that,
while leaving unresolved the overall issue of limitations on church gatherings,
included Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion observing that unlike
churches and concerts, businesses that remained open to larger gatherings
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were those “in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain
in close proximity for extended periods.”129
Judge Easterbrook further acknowledged, however, that some businesses
remained open to large gatherings even though they placed risks similar to
those posed by large church gatherings, and some workplaces, such as
meatpacking plants, nursing homes, and others, were sources of significant
COVID-19 outbreaks.130 Still, Judge Easterbrook distinguished between
these businesses and churches as well, through an examination of the relative
necessity of a large gathering for each to function. Here, Judge Easterbrook
appears to have crossed the line drawn by the Supreme Court’s hands-off
approach, evaluating the theological substance of the plaintiffs’ free exercise
claim.
As Judge Easterbrook pointed out, “soup kitchens and housing for the
homeless have been treated as essential [because t]hose activities must be
carried on in person, while concerts can be replaced by recorded music [and]
movie-going by streaming video.”131 Although this distinction, such as it is,
seems reasonable and justifiable—if not demonstrably correct—Justice
Easterbrook included prayer gatherings within the latter category, declaring
that “large in-person worship services [can be replaced] by smaller
gatherings, radio and TV worship services, drive-in worship services, and the
Internet.”132 In short, Judge Easterbrook found that “[f]eeding the body
requires teams of people to work together in physical spaces,” but he insisted
that “churches can feed the spirit in other ways.”133
On one level, Judge Easterbrook’s analysis appears to have flatly defied
the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to questions of religious practice
and belief. After all, the claimants who challenged the restrictions on
religious gatherings as violating their free exercise rights surely did not
consider Judge Easterbrook’s blithe assessment of their religious
commitments to present an accurate portrayal of their religious beliefs.
Instead, Judge Easterbrook seemed to impose on religious adherents his own
understanding of the burden they faced, rather than accepting their
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characterization of the necessities of their own religious practice, which could
not simply be “replaced” by “feed[ing] the spirit in other ways.”134
On another level, though, Judge Easterbrook’s analysis—somewhat
characteristically—laid bare some of the underlying tensions and problems
latent in the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach, issues that would soon
reemerge in the Court’s decisions in July 2020135 and that would continue to
serve as a subtext—if not an express focus—of the ongoing debates over
religious liberty and COVID-19.136 One of the primary critiques of the
hands-off approach is premised on the concern that if judges prove too
deferential to religious claimants’ depictions of their religious practices and
beliefs, the resulting decisions will prove too burdensome on society as a
whole.137 To be sure, crediting the substantive accuracy of a religious claim
need not determine the outcome of a case; even under a strict scrutiny
standard, a court will balance the exercise of religion against governmental
and societal needs.138 Nevertheless, the potential remains for deference to
the religious substance of a claim to yield a similar deference to the legal
merit of the claim. Accordingly, it seems, notwithstanding the Court’s handsoff approach, Judge Easterbrook found that a careful consideration of the
legal merits of the plaintiffs’ claim required a similarly careful evaluation of
the religious substance of the claim.
Notably, Judge Easterbrook’s analysis was not adopted by other courts
that have considered challenges to limitations imposed on religious
gatherings during the COVID-19 crisis, including several courts that have
upheld governmental restrictions in the face of free exercise challenges.139 In
134
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Sisolak, No. 320-00303, 2020 WL 4260438, at *3 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020), rev’d and remanded, 982
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particular, Judge Easterbrook’s disregard for the Supreme Court’s hands-off
approach to questions of religious practice and belief poses a striking contrast
to the analysis in Roberts v. Neace140 and Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear,141
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit just one
month earlier.
Unlike Judge Easterbrook, the Sixth Circuit held that restrictions
imposed by the Governor of Kentucky, as applied to religious gatherings,
should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.142 More to the point,
the Sixth Circuit faithfully applied the hands-off approach, refusing to allow
the government’s—or its own—understanding of the necessities of religious
worship to supplant the religious beliefs asserted by the claimants. As the
Sixth Circuit acknowledged, “[s]ure, the Church might use Zoom services or
the like, as so many places of worship have decided to do over the last two
months.”143 However, in addition to noting potential technological burdens,
the court rhetorically asked the fundamental question underlying the handsoff approach: “[W]ho is . . . to say that every member of the congregation
must see it as an adequate substitute for what it means when ‘two or three
gather in my Name,’ or what it means when ‘not forsaking the assembling of
ourselves together.’ [?]”144
In fact, the judges who issued the Sixth Circuit’s per curiam opinions
expressed “[a]s individuals, . . . some sympathy for Governor DeWine’s
approach—to allow places of worship in Ohio to hold services but then to
admonish all of them (we assume) that it’s ‘not Christian’ to hold in-person
services during a pandemic.”145 As the same judges emphasized, however,
“the Free Exercise Clause does not protect sympathetic religious practices
alone.”146 Expressing a basic tenet of the hands-off approach, the court
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concluded: “And that's exactly what the federal courts are not to judge—how
individuals comply with their own faith as they see it.”147
When challenges to limitations on religious gatherings have reached the
Supreme Court, cases have revealed a heavily fractured Court, issuing
sharply divided—if not unclear—decisions. Although the hands-approach
has not appeared as prominently in these cases, abiding concerns over the
contours and content of the hands-off approach may have played an implicit
and underlying role in producing these largely unsatisfying results. At the
same time, somewhat ironically, the cases often turned on divisions among
the Justices over a different form of judicial deference, pursuant to which
courts may be deemed precluded from second-guessing government officials’
determinations over matters of health and safety, particularly amidst a
medical emergency.
Like the lower court rulings, the Supreme Court decisions in these cases
have typically centered on balancing the free exercise of religion against
safety concerns amid the COVID-19 pandemic, which has entailed drawing
comparisons and contrasts between religious worship and other activities.
For example, in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (I),148 decided at
the end of May 2020, the majority denied an application for injunctive relief
against a California limitation on the size of a gathering.
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Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981))).
140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).

February 2022]

RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS IN THE ERA OF COVID-19

305

Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the denial of the application,
observing that “[s]imilar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable
secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator
sports, and theatrical performances” and that “the Order exempts or treats
more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores,
banks, and laundromats . . . .”149 The concurrence also emphasized that
“[t]he precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities
should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter
subject to reasonable disagreement[ ,]” entrusted primarily to “the politically
accountable officials of the States[,]” which generally “should not be subject
to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary[.]’”150 Thus, while the
Court’s hands-off approach to religious questions did not arise in the
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts adopted, as it were, a different hands-off
approach, to the decision making of government officials. Four Justices
dissented from the majority’s denial of the application, with Justice
Kavanaugh issuing a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. In
response to Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence, the dissent found that
“absent a compelling justification (which the State has not offered), the State
may not take a looser approach with, say, supermarkets, restaurants,
factories, and offices while imposing stricter requirements on places of
worship.”151
Likewise, in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak,152 decided near the end
of July 2020, the Court denied an application for injunctive relief challenging
a Nevada limitation on the size of religious gatherings, with the same four
Justices dissenting. Justice Alito, in a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and
Kavanaugh, emphasized at some length the contrast to more permissive rules
governing other places of public activity, including—but not limited to—
casinos.153 As Justice Alito put it: “While the directive’s treatment of casinos
stands out, other facilities are also given more favorable treatment than
houses of worship. Take the example of bowling alleys.”154 Justice Gorsuch
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raised a similar point, in a brief but strongly worded dissent, suggesting that
“[i]n Nevada, it seems, it is better to be in entertainment than religion.
Maybe that is nothing new.”155 However, he declared, “the First
Amendment prohibits such obvious discrimination against the exercise of
religion . . . . [T]here is no world in which the Constitution permits Nevada
to favor Caesars Palace over Calvary Chapel.”156
Justice Kavanaugh issued an additional dissent of his own, viewing the
different treatment of religious gatherings and other public activities through
the lens of an extensive analysis of both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. According to Justice Kavanaugh, “Nevada’s 50person attendance cap on religious worship services puts praying at churches,
synagogues, temples, and mosques on worse footing than eating at
restaurants, drinking at bars, gambling at casinos, or biking at gyms. In other
words, Nevada is discriminating against religion.” 157
As to the need for judicial deference to the government’s decisions over
public health and safety, Justice Kavanaugh acknowledged broad
governmental authority to address “COVID-19 matters such as quarantine
requirements, testing plans, mask mandates, phased reopenings, school
closures, sports rules, adjustment of voting and election procedures, state
court and correctional institution practices, and the like.”158 Nevertheless,
Justice Kavanaugh insisted that “[t]here are certain constitutional red lines
that a State may not cross even in a crisis.”159 Finding that “[t]his Court’s
history is littered with unfortunate examples of overly broad judicial
deference to the government when the government has invoked emergency
powers and asserted crisis circumstances to override equal-treatment and
free-speech principles,”160 Justice Kavanaugh resorted to “[t]he court of
history” to “reject[] those jurisprudential mistakes and caution[] against an
unduly deferential judicial approach, especially when questions of racial
discrimination, religious discrimination, or free speech are at stake.”161
The Supreme Court’s rulings took a sudden change of direction, in both
rhetoric and result, late in the fall of 2020, through a decision handed down
155
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just before midnight on the eve of Thanksgiving. In Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo,162 the Court issued a per curiam majority opinion granting
injunctive relief to a church and a synagogue that challenged the New York
Governor’s restrictions on occupancy limits. The majority opinion
prompted no fewer than five other opinions—two concurring and three
dissenting—illustrating the extent to which the Justices remain divided on
urgent issues of both short-term and long-term importance.
Among a variety of complex substantive, procedural, and policy
considerations, the Court’s opinion included a broad application of the
hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief, diametrically
opposed to Judge Easterbrook’s analysis in Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v.
Pritzker.163 As the Court noted, “[i]f only 10 people are admitted to each
service, the great majority of those who wish to attend Mass on Sunday or
services in a synagogue on Shabbat will be barred.”164 Moreover, the Court
explained, “[W]hile those who are shut out may in some instances be able to
watch services on television, such remote viewing is not the same as personal
attendance. Catholics who watch a Mass at home cannot receive
communion, and there are important religious traditions in the Orthodox
Jewish faith that require personal attendance.”165 Thus, the Court deferred
to the claimants’ understanding of their own religious practices and beliefs,
rather than relying on the Court’s judgment as to possible—and, perhaps,
seemingly reasonable—substitute or alternative forms of religious
observance.
Returning to the central themes—if not the tone—of his dissent in Calvary
Chapel, Justice Gorsuch offered a concurring opinion stating, rather
caustically, that “according to the Governor, it may be unsafe to go to
church, but it is always fine to pick up another bottle of wine, shop for a new
bike, or spend the afternoon exploring your distal points and meridians. Who
knew public health would so perfectly align with secular convenience?”166
Here too, Justice Gorsuch observed that support for the restrictions appeared
to be based in a different form of judicial deference, “a particular judicial
162
163
164
165
166
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impulse to stay out of the way in times of crisis.”167 He responded, however,
that “if that impulse may be understandable or even admirable in other
circumstances, we may not shelter in place when the Constitution is under
attack. Things never go well when we do.”168 On a similar note, Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence returned, almost verbatim, to the main thrust of
his Calvary Chapel dissent, acknowledging that courts “must afford substantial
deference to state and local authorities about how best to balance competing
policy considerations during the pandemic[,]”169 but emphasizing that
“judicial deference in an emergency or a crisis does not mean wholesale
judicial abdication, especially when important questions of religious
discrimination, racial discrimination, free speech, or the like are raised.”170
With the outcome of the cases reversed, the Justices underwent a role
reversal as well, as the Justices who were part of the majority in South Bay and
Calvary Chapel now found themselves dissenting, while reasserting and
defending their own deferential approach—not the hands-off approach to
religious questions, but the deference they had shown to the government’s
safety determinations. For example, Chief Justice Roberts responded
directly to Justice Gorsuch, countering that “[t]o be clear, I do not regard
my dissenting colleagues as ‘cutting the Constitution loose during a
pandemic,’ yielding to ‘a particular judicial impulse to stay out of the way in
times of crisis,’ or ‘shelter[ing] in place when the Constitution is under
attack.’”171 Rather, he argued, “[t]hey simply view the matter differently
after careful study and analysis reflecting their best efforts to fulfill their
responsibility under the Constitution.”172 For his part, Justice Breyer, joined
by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, emphasized procedural grounds for
denying the application, while adding quotations from Chief Justice
Roberts’s South Bay concurrence in support of judicial deference to the
discretion of elected officials.173 Finally, Justice Sotomayor, in a dissent
joined by Justice Kagan, found that the case was similar enough to South
Bay and Calvary Chapel—in fact, she wrote, “easier” than those cases—and,
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therefore, should yield a similar result.174 Echoing the other dissenters who
argued in favor of deference to the state officials, she warned that “Justices of
this Court play a deadly game in second guessing the expert judgment of
health officials about the environments in which a contagious virus, now
infecting a million Americans each week, spreads most easily.”175
Months later, in February 2021, the Supreme Court revisited and
redecided the case of South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (II).176 This
time, the Court seemed more fractured than ever: the Court granted the
application for an injunction in part; Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would
have granted the application in full; Justice Alito would have granted the
application in part, in a way that differed from the majority’s ruling; Chief
Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion; Justice Barrett, joined by Justice
Kavanaugh, wrote a concurring opinion; Justice Gorsuch wrote a Statement,
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito; and Justice Kagan, joined by Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor, wrote a dissenting opinion. Yet again, disputes over
the appropriate form and degree of judicial deference loomed large in the
differing views of the increasingly divided Court.
Chief Justice Roberts, whose concurrence in South Bay (I)177 had figured
so centrally in earlier calls for deference to the judgment of state officials, now
second-guessed their determination “that the maximum number of
adherents who can safely worship in the most cavernous cathedral is zero”
as “reflect[ing] not expertise or discretion, but instead insufficient
appreciation or consideration of the interests at stake.”178 In short,
“[d]eference, though broad, has its limits.”179 While Justice Barrett offered
a brief—and somewhat cautious—concurrence, Justice Gorsuch returned to
both the substance and the harsh tones of his previous opinions. First, he
emphasized that “[i]t has never been enough for the State to insist on
deference or demand that individual rights give way to collective
interests.”180 Therefore, while acknowledging that, “[o]f course we are not
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scientists,” he insisted that “neither may we abandon the field when
government officials with experts in tow seek to infringe a constitutionally
protected liberty.”181 Moreover, he declared, “[i]t seems California’s
powerful entertainment industry has won an exemption. So, once more, we
appear to have a State playing favorites during a pandemic, expending
considerable effort to protect lucrative industries (casinos in Nevada; movie
studios in California) while denying similar largesse to its faithful.”182 In a
closing shot, Justice Gorsuch added that “it is too late for the State to defend
extreme measures with claims of temporary exigency, if it ever could.
Drafting narrowly tailored regulations can be difficult.”183 Still, “if
Hollywood may host a studio audience or film a singing competition while
not a single soul may enter California’s churches, synagogues, and mosques,
something has gone seriously awry.”184
Finally, Justice Kagan dissented, mounting yet a further call for deference
to governmental decisions in response to the COVID-19 virus. Throughout
her dissent, Justice Kagan criticized the majority for defying a hands-off
approach to the judgment of medical experts and state officials: “Justices of
this Court are not scientists. Nor do we know much about public health
policy. Yet today the Court displaces the judgments of experts about how to
respond to a raging pandemic.”185 Along these lines, she continued, “[t]o
state the obvious, judges do not know what scientists and public health
experts do.”186 Therefore, while “I am sure that, in deciding this case, every
Justice carefully examined the briefs and read the decisions below[,] . . . . I
cannot imagine that any of us delved into the scientific research on how
COVID spreads, or studied the strategies for containing it.”187 Accordingly,
she found it “alarming that the Court second-guesses the judgments of expert
officials, and displaces their conclusions with its own.”188
If Justice Gorsuch concluded his Statement caustically, Justice Kagan
ended her dissent ominously, warning that “[i]n the worst public health crisis
in a century, this foray into armchair epidemiology cannot end well. . . . The
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Court injects uncertainty into an area where uncertainty has human
costs.”189 Adding a closing shot of her own, Justice Kagan declared:
I fervently hope that the Court’s intervention will not worsen the Nation’s
COVID crisis. But if this decision causes suffering, we will not pay. Our
marble halls are now closed to the public, and our life tenure forever insulates
us from responsibility for our errors. That would seem good reason to avoid
disrupting a State’s pandemic response. But the Court forges ahead
regardless, insisting that science-based policy yield to judicial edict.190

CONCLUSION
In a time of crisis, underlying, unaddressed, and unremedied problems
often rise to the surface. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States
has undergone such a crisis, unlike any other in recent memory. The nation
has been hurting, having experienced a prolonged and collective period of
physical, political, and emotional turmoil and uncertainty, during which
words and actions among the executive and legislative branches of
government have, all-too-often, served to exacerbate harmful divisions, both
preexisting and emerging. At such a time, it might be hoped that the judicial
branch, most prominently the United States Supreme Court, would offer a
measure of stability and healing, serving as a uniting force for the county.
Unfortunately, however, among courts as well, differences over
fundamental elements of Religion Clause jurisprudence have risen to the
surface, resulting in a continuing and growing sense of division and discord.
Of course, differences in opinion, among the public, politicians, and judges,
are to be expected and embraced, expressing the diversity of perspectives
contributing to public discourse and policy. Still, the widening gap in
attitudes among courts across the country, including an increasingly
fractured Supreme Court, in addressing vital matters of religious practice
during the COVID-19 crisis, may be reason for concern.
As in the past, along with other factors, the current divisions among the
courts, both doctrinal and rhetorical, have often turned on attitudes toward
the hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief. Thus,
these cases demonstrate the abiding relevance—and limitations—of the
hands-off approach, in both ordinary and extraordinary times. Looking
189
190

Id.
Id.

312

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

forward, it can only be hoped that the Supreme Court will closely examine
the critiques, acknowledge the underlying problems, and consider some of
the proposals that, for decades, scholars, dissenting justices, and others have
offered, toward a more workable, more effective, and more uniting approach
to questions of religious practice and belief.

